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Lessing’s Laocoon and the ‘as-if’ of aesthetic experience 
 
‘VIEL FEIND, VIEL EHR’’ 
Is the German proverb ‘Viel Feind, viel Ehr’’ (‘many critics, much honour’) more 
than a consolatory topos that comes in handy when our work has failed to 
convince our peers? If so, then the Laocoon ranks high among the texts proving 
its truth. It is simultaneously famous, arguably one of the most prominent treatises 
in the field of aesthetics, and the object of vehement criticism, even outright 
bashing. Only three years after the Laocoon came out, Herder published his first 
Kritisches Wäldchen, a response that, running over more than 250 pages in the 
original edition, is as disparaging as it is detailed.
1
 More recent reception features 
attacks no less fierce. Critics have, in particular, unveiled the chauvinist agenda 
underlying Lessing’s comparison of poetry with painting. There are strong 
nationalistic overtones, as Lessing, enlisting British authors such as Shakespeare 
and Milton as allies, rants against the decadent French who corrupt poetry through 
pictorialism.
2
  
The entanglement of the aesthetic with political issues is palpable in the 
borderline-metaphor for the relation between poetry and painting:  
But as two equitable and friendly neighbors do not permit the one to take 
unbecoming liberties in the heart of the other’s domain, yet on their 
extreme frontiers practice a mutual forbearance by which both sides make 
peaceful compensation for those slight aggressions which, in haste and 
from force of circumstance, the one finds himself compelled to make on 
the other’s privilege: so also with painting and poetry.3  
The imagery used to illustrate the relation between poetry and painting seems to 
unmask the political program underlying an aesthetic argument. 
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Further agendas that are equally unpopular in current criticism map onto the 
political frontier in the Laocoon. It has been pointed out that the juxtaposition of 
painting and poetry is gendered: whereas the passive and beautiful bodies 
depicted by painting evoke the idea of femininity, the actions represented in 
poetry exude masculinity.
4
 The privileging of poetry over painting also bears out 
the Protestant esteem for the word and seems to reflect an Anti-Catholic bias. 
‘There is’, as one critic (himself raised a Roman Catholic) puts it, ‘fear in the 
Laocoon that the visual might excite viewers into Catholicism...’5 Nationalistic, 
sexist and Protestant, a stronger captatio malevolentiae for critics today seems 
hard to come by. 
The Laocoon’s argument has also proven open to challenge from the perspective 
of aesthetics. The paradigm of mimesis on which it is predicated began to lose its 
plausibility during Lessing’s lifetime. 6  Seen less and less as imitation of the 
world, art was increasingly conceptualized as the expression of a creative subject. 
In the 20th century the linguistic turn and other theoretical approaches further 
discredited the idea of mimesis understood as a faithful representation of the 
world. 
It has been noted that pictures are by no means confined to representing a single 
moment, as Lessing assumes.
7
 Counterexamples are easy to find, Poussin’s 
Gathering of Manna being a case in point [Fig. XX]: on the left, we see the 
starving Israelites, on the right, Israelites picking up the Manna. The two phases 
of the picture are spatially very close and intricately linked – there is a continuous 
group of Israelites rather than two distinct parties. In the foreground, for example, 
a young man leaning over an old man gestures to the right where others are busy 
picking up the Manna. Conversely, some of the figures who have already received 
the Manna turn to the left, seemingly to help those still suffering. Poussin’s 
painting illustrates that even the major Western tradition of painting harbors 
works which express a sequence through embedding more than one scene in a 
single frame. 
However, Lessing’s assumption is not as arbitrary as it may seem; it is part and 
parcel of his notion of mimesis. For Lessing, pictorial representation hinges on the 
similarity of spatial relations. It mimics a spatial layout. Paintings that do not do 
so are like texts which describe objects in space.
8
 Just as such texts do not 
capitalize on the mimetic potential encapsulated in their sequential nature, 
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paintings representing more than one moment fail to deploy their mimetic means 
which are spatial (‘means of imitation, which it can combine in space only’9). 
Lessing’s idea of pictures as window-like is thus firmly rooted in his concept of 
mimesis. That being said, it is by no means self-evident, but a normative thesis 
that narrative and pictorial mimesis is temporal and spatial respectively. 
If we turn from the content of representation to its reception, further challenges to 
Lessing’s argument arise. 10  We perceive words, sentences and stories 
sequentially, but we make sense of them synchronically.
11
 In order to comprehend 
a sentence, we have to attend to its entire construction. When we interpret a 
tragedy, we envisage the plot in its entirety. Our processing of texts thus 
interweaves diachrony with synchrony. Inversely, neuro-cognitivists have 
confirmed that we do not process pictures in a single moment.
12
 The area grasped 
by our eye is tiny, so the eye constantly jumps from one point to another. How 
long it takes to view a painting varies and ultimately defies definition, but viewing 
is not a simultaneous activity. Reception thus tinges pictures with sequence and 
poetry with simultaneity. 
Our list of criticisms and counter-arguments could be extended. Still, I wish to 
make a case that the Laocoon merits our attention not only for historical reasons: 
its shortcomings notwithstanding, the Laocoon is a text that can still inspire 
theoretical discussions today. In this paper, I would like to show that nothing less 
than Lessing’s association of poetry with time and painting with space can 
enhance our understanding of aesthetic experience.
13
 Of course, the flaws of 
Lessing’s model will have to be kept in mind and will require some qualifications. 
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Nonetheless, Lessing’s juxtaposition of poetry with painting is more than fodder 
for the deconstructivist furor of recent scholarship.
14
 
Before I start, a clarifying word on terminology and concepts is in place. A 
modification of the frame of Lessing’s argument as well as a shift of parameters is 
necessary for the use I would like to make of the Laocoon’s ideas. This may 
irritate readers whose interest in the Laocoon is primarily historical, and yet, 
while twisting and tweaking Lessing’s argument, such an engagement seems fully 
in the spirit of a text that establishes systematic claims.
15
 
Beginning with Lessing’s first readers, the terms of poetry and painting faced 
criticism.
16
 Herder noted that sequence and representation of action are not 
features specific to poetry.
17
 Lessing does not explicitly define ‘Poesie’, but his 
choice of examples implies that he thinks of metrically bound texts (and above all 
epic).
18
 It is however narrative, whether in verse or prose, that is most closely tied 
to time. The doubling of time at the level of representation and the level of 
represented that is key to Lessing’s argument has been conceptualized in the 
dichotomy of narrative and narrated time: on the one hand, the action narrated 
takes time; on the other, its narration unfolds in time.
19
 This is not the place to 
enter into the debate whether this distinction provides a satisfying definition of 
narrative. For my purposes, it suffices that the doubling of time is without a doubt 
a salient aspect of narrative in a wide range of media such as oral speech, writing 
and film.  
Even more puzzling than the deployment of poetry is the reference to ‘Malerei’ in 
a treatise that derives its name from a sculpture. As Nicolai observed in 1768: ‘In 
my view, he considers painting not from the right perspective; he fails to 
distinguish it sufficiently from sculpture from which it is essentially different.’20 
Lessing deals not so much with painting as, more generally, with static visual 
artworks. To avoid confusion, I will speak of pictures. I will focus on pictorial 
representations that are two-dimensional, but my argument, mutatis mutandis, will 
also apply to sculpture.  
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I would thus like to replace Lessing’s dichotomy of poetry and painting with that 
of narrative and picture. While not true to the letter of the Laocoon, this shift 
redefines the objects under discussion to fit Lessing’s argument. The focus on 
narrative instead of on word or text in particular advances its plausibility. It will 
also pave the way for my attempt to demonstrate the significance of the time-
space dichotomy for aesthetic experience. 
My starting point will be one of the most comprehensive approaches in recent 
aesthetics. In his theory of ‘make-believe’, Kendall Walton shows that our 
response to representations is predicated on an ‘as-if’.21 One of the points where 
Walton’s theory falters is with regard to the differences in the ‘make-believe’ 
triggered by different forms of representation (II). Here, I will argue, Lessing’s 
Laocoon can help if we are willing to change some of its parameters. This use of 
the Laocoon will lead us to an aspect of aesthetic experience where the time-space 
dichotomy proves fruitful. To make my case, I will draw on phenomenological 
theory, notably from Husserl for narrative and Wollheim for pictures (III). 
 
WALTON’S ‘MAKE-BELIEVE’ 
Walton’s Mimesis as Make-Believe straddles the rigor of analytical philosophy 
and the breadth of the continental tradition.
22
 Both the reception and ontology of 
art are subjected to piercing scrutiny. The representational arts that are the object 
of Walton’s investigation cover a wide field including novels and stories as well 
as visual and performative arts. The clue to Walton’s theory, basic but seminal, is 
that he understands artistic representation as analogous with children’s games. 
When children play, they plunge themselves into fictional worlds, adopting the 
identities of cops and robbers, princes and princesses, etc. In such games, children 
often use objects as ‘props’: tree-stumps, for example, are taken as bears, 
branches become guns and lawns figure as lakes. The representational arts, 
Walton proposes, invite us to participate in similar plays of ‘make-believe’. Texts 
and paintings alike serve as ‘props’, immersing the recipient in fictional worlds.  
The analogy between children’s games and representational arts admittedly has its 
limits. ‘Props’ are often marginal in children’s games, which can even do entirely 
without them. Artworks, on the other hand, are indispensable for the artistic 
generation of fictional worlds. The quality of representation that is crucial for the 
depth of an aesthetic experience plays a minor role for the significance of ‘props’ 
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when children play.
23
 What makes the analogy so fertile though is the tension 
between immersion and distance. Children may scream and run away, but they do 
not actually believe that they are facing a bear. Similarly, the beholder of a 
painting sees shoes, but knows that what is in front of her is not a pair of actual 
shoes. While imagining Madame Bovary and her lover and being engrossed in 
their dispute, the reader is aware of attending to a story. Even in cinema, endowed 
with great immersive potential through the combination of picture and narrative 
and marshalling a vast technical apparatus, the flat screen reminds the viewer of 
the mediation taking place. It is one of Walton’s major merits to pinpoint the role 
of the ‘as-if’ in the reception of a wide range of artworks. Novels, dramas, films, 
sculptures and painting are aligned by evoking worlds in which recipients delve 
without forgetting that what they are attending to is only a representation. 
Taking some liberty, one could say that Walton reassesses Kant’s notion of 
disinterestedness. Kant contrasts the free and disinterested pleasure 
(‘Wohlgefallen’) triggered by beautiful objects with the pleasure that pleasant 
(‘angenehme’) and good (‘gute’) objects instill in the subject.24 The latter two 
interact with the ‘Begehrungsvermögen’ and make the subject take interest in the 
existence of the object. In the case of beautiful objects, on the other hand, the 
subject feels pleasure by merely regarding the object without linking it to himself. 
It is the free and harmonious play of the cognitive faculties that gives the subject 
pleasure (‘Lust’). Walton’s approach envisages the detachment of the recipient 
differently. Not confined to beautiful objects, it is defined as the tension between 
immersion and distance. Artistic representations direct our attention to what they 
represent and simultaneously bracket this attention with the frame of ‘as-if’. 
Walton’s approach is not without problems, however.25 The issue that is most 
exigent for my purposes is that ‘make-believe’ seems to work differently in texts 
and pictures. Walton fails to account for this difference. In his argument, there is a 
bewildering asymmetry in that, while ‘pictures are fiction by definition’,26 texts 
can be either fiction or non-fiction: ‘It is not the function of biographies, 
textbooks and newspaper articles, as such, to serve as props in games of make-
believe. They are used to claim truth for certain propositions rather than make 
propositions fictional.’27 A confusion of different concepts of fiction seems to be 
at work here. Walton introduces fiction as synonymous with representations,
28
 
thus understanding it as ‘things with the function of being props in games of 
make-believe’.29  In this sense, pictures, even abstract ones as Walton argues, 
constitute fiction. Now when he considers biographies as non-fiction and 
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therefore rules them out as props, a different concept of fiction has crept in: 
fiction is here defined as referring to invented instead of real material.
30
 The 
category of representation, however, cuts across this dichotomy: factual as well as 
fictitious stories are represented. Games of make-believe can immerse us in 
events that have actually taken place.  
Walton himself seems to be not entirely comfortable with his exclusion of non-
fictional texts; his discomfort becomes apparent when he admits that some 
histories, ‘written in such a vivid, novelistic style that they almost inevitably 
induce the reader to imagine what is said, regardless of whether or not he believes 
it’,31 can be read as fiction and thus serve as props in games of ‘make-believe’. 
Walton’s qualification, while still stuck in the confusion of different concepts of 
fiction, highlights that ‘make-believe’ is not confined to fictional (as opposed to 
factual) stories. 
Even if we save Walton’s theory from the confusion generated by the Protean 
concept of fiction, the ‘make-believe’ of texts does not map onto the ‘make-
believe’ of pictures. This problem comes to the fore in Walton’s discussion of 
deictic references to pictures. His example is Stephen pointing at a picture, 
namely Shore at Scheveningen, and saying ‘That is a ship.’32 Walton is mostly 
concerned with the semantics of this sentence, whether it refers to the picture or 
only to a specific part of it, to a fictitious entity or to the representation. Truly 
disconcerting, however, is the observation, raised only in passing, that nobody 
would refer to the description of Pequod in Moby Dick and say ‘That is a ship’ - 
although ‘Moby Dick is a ship-representation too, to which one can refer by 
pointing’.33  
‘The difference’, Marie-Laure Ryan points out, ‘resides in the fact that while 
paintings depict iconically, words signify conventionally.’34 More poignantly, the 
role of sense perception in textual and pictorial games of ‘make-believe’ varies: 
whereas the signs of texts that we see trigger our imagination, the pictorial ‘make-
believe’ is inherent in our perception of the painting. 35  While providing an 
impressive model that covers a wide range of representational arts, Walton 
glosses over the fundamental difference between the aesthetic experiences 
triggered by pictures and narratives. I will now try to show that the Laocoon, with 
some twisting, can help us better understand this difference. 
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TIME AND SPACE IN AND BEYOND THE LAOCOON 
As we have seen, Lessing’s definition of poetry as temporal and of painting as 
spatial is problematic. It hinges on an idea of mimesis that conflicts with the 
practice of both poets and painters. Moreover, the reception of narrative and 
pictures disturbs the neat juxtaposition of space with time: the signs of language 
follow upon one another, and yet our understanding of them is also synchronic. 
Likewise, we do not view paintings in a single moment, but our eyes dart across 
the picture. Our response to both narrative and picture is premised on an intricate 
dialectic of synchronic and diachronic comprehension. That being said, I contend 
that the Laocoon’s juxtaposition of space and time holds good exactly at the point 
where Walton’s concept of ‘make-believe’ falters. The ‘as-if’ of our response to 
narrative is primarily temporal, while the ‘as-if’ involved in pictorial seeing is 
primarily spatial. My use of ‘primarily’ here anticipates an important 
qualification: just as there may also be spatial aspects to the ‘as-if’ of narrative, 
pictures are capable of triggering a temporal ‘as-if’. Before making this point 
though, the basic distinction between the narrative and pictorial forms of ‘as-if’ 
needs to be argued fully. 
The temporal nature of the ‘as-if’ actuated by narrative can be elucidated with 
Husserl’s analysis of the temporal structure of our consciousness. Leaving aside 
objective time, Husserl dissects time as it appears to us.
36
 How, he wonders, is a 
temporal continuum constituted that consists of various phases? What secures the 
identity of ‘Zeitobjekte’ ‘that are not only unities in time but that also contain 
temporal extension themselves’?37 A sound, Husserl’s example of choice, starts, 
continues and fades, but nonetheless it appears to us as a single unit. The key to 
Husserl’s answer is the notion of retention. Impressions make way for new 
impressions, but instead of simply vanishing, past impressions are retained in the 
modified form of retention. These retentions coexist with the actual impression 
that is itself about to be transformed into a retention including the retention of its 
own retentions:  
The tone-now changes into a tone-having-been; the impressional 
consciousness, constantly flowing, passes over into ever new retentional 
consciousness. Going along the flow or with it, we have a continuous 
series of retentions pertaining to the beginning point.’38  
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Perception is thus not a mere point incapable of generating a continuum, but 
contains an ‘Abschattungsreihe’ (series of adumbrations) in which previous nows 
have sedimented.  
Distinct from this continuously moving chain of retentions is memory or 
secondary retention. Memory is not the presence of nows that have just passed, 
but the representation of something that is not present anymore in the continuum 
of perception. This representation recalls not only the past moment to which our 
attention is directed, but also the chain of retentions of that passed moment. 
Husserl takes pains to set off the reproductive consciousness of memory from 
primary retention
39
 as well as from phantasy, which does not relate to a past 
impression.
40
 
The goal of explaining the notion of continuum lets Husserl focus on retention, 
both primary and secondary, but he also introduces the concept of protention and 
expectation, though much more fleetingly. Protentions correspond to primary 
retentions just as expectations mirror memory. Our impressions have not only a 
chain of retentions retaining the impressions that have just passed, but also come 
with protentions, intentions of the consciousness that are directed towards what is 
to come.
41
 Likewise, besides recalling past impressions including its field of pro- 
and retentions, the consciousness can also produce images of the future.
42
 Husserl 
introduces the notion of protention only when he discusses the 
‘Erwartungsintentionen’ (expectation-intentions) in memory43 and elaborates on 
expectation only by comparing it with memory,
44
 and yet for a systematic analysis 
of the temporal dynamic of consciousness the orientation to the future is as 
important as the openness to the past. Heidegger, replacing Husserl’s focus on 
perception with his emphasis on ‘Sorge’ (care), would even privilege the future 
dimension. 
Now, the value of Husserl’s Vorlesungen zur Struktur des inneren 
Zeitbewußtseins for my argument is that it also describes the process by which we 
receive stories.
45
 When we follow narrative, our consciousness directs its series of 
pro- and retentions to the linguistic signs and the action they convey. While our 
memory can evoke parts of the plot that have already faded from the present 
series of adumbrations, expectations arise as to the further course of the plot. 
Differently from real-life experiences, however, our attention to the plot is framed 
by our awareness of attending to a representation. No matter how much the story 
entices us, our real-life environment remains present as the horizon to our 
experiencing of the narrative world. The intensity of immersion varies 
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significantly, but there is always a residuum of distance balancing immersion in 
aesthetic experience.  
The vicarious nature of our experience of narrated worlds is a point that is fully 
captured by Walton. But what Walton does not note – and what we find in the 
Laocoon – is the specific character of the ‘as-if’. Lessing’s juxtaposition of Poesie 
with Malerei encapsulates the crucial point. The association of Poesie with time 
paves the way for the insight that the narrative ‘as-if’ is directed to the temporal 
extension of our consciousness. When we follow a narrative, then it is first and 
foremost the field of our pro- and retentions that is bracketed. 
But doesn’t this temporal structure define our consciousness in general, regardless 
of the object of our attention?  If so, doesn’t it therefore also apply to our viewing 
of a picture? Indeed, the sequence of eye-movements in which we take in a 
picture, while less defined than the fixed sequence of signs constituting a 
narrative,
46
 embraces a series of adumbrations. However, and this is decisive, the 
‘as-if’ of an aesthetic experience generated by a picture is not directed to this set 
of pro- and retentions. Here, as Lessing’s understanding of Malerei suggests, the 
‘as-if’ refers to space. Richard Wollheim’s concept of ‘seeing-in’ can help us 
grasp its distinct character. 
Wollheim develops his theory of pictorial seeing in a critique of Gombrich’s 
illusion-theory.
47
 Gombrich adduces the notorious drawing that can be seen either 
as a duck or as a rabbit as evidence for his thesis that we see either the canvas or 
the object represented, but never both simultaneously. The example of the duck-
rabbit, however, made famous by its discussion in Wittgenstein’s Philosophische 
Untersuchungen, has no bearing on the dichotomy of canvas and object of 
representation. The choice between rabbit and duck is mutually exclusive indeed: 
one can see only either, but it is a choice between two different objects of 
representation, not between representing object and represented object. In his 
‘twofold thesis’, Wollheim argues that it is not only possible, but necessary to 
attend simultaneously to the object of a representation and its material features.
48
 
Seeing pictures is based on ‘a special perceptual capacity, which presupposes, but 
is something over and above, straightforward perception’.49 This special mode of 
perception is labeled as ‘seeing-in’: when we see an object in a picture, we are 
aware of the canvas as well as the represented object. 
Wollheim subsequently refined his model of ‘seeing-in’. Initially, he introduced 
seeing a represented object and seeing a representing object as two experiences. 
Later, he treated them as ‘two aspects of a single experience that I have’.50 
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‘Discerning something in the marked surface’, on the one hand, is the 
‘recognitional aspect’, ‘our awareness of the marked surface itself’, on the other, 
is the ‘configurational aspect’.51 ‘The two aspects are distinguishable but also 
inseparable.’ 52  While the two aspects can be described in analogy with the 
separate single experiences, they are ultimately incommensurable with them. 
What is crucial for my argument is that the ‘as-if’ of pictorial seeing hinges on the 
simultaneous attention to the represented object and the representing object.
53
 It is 
thus not temporal, but spatial: the attention that is bracketed by ‘as-if’ is directed 
to an object in space. The tableau, for example, lets us see a three-dimensional 
scene in a two-dimensional surface. For all its differences – while working in a 
three- rather than two-dimensional space – sculpture is also predicated on a spatial 
‘as-if’. We see in statues not only the surface but the body with its muscles, bones 
and veins. While being aware of having a stone in front of us, we apprehend a 
full-blown body. Richard Neer makes the point nicely in his discussion of Greek 
statues from the Classical period: ‘Seeing a sculpted garment, we tend 
automatically to imagine that it covers a body, even as we know that it does 
not.’54 
As with narrative, Lessing’s paragone leads the way, this time binding up pictures 
with space. The spatial nature of Malerei for which Lessing argues gestures to the 
distinct character of the aesthetic experience pictures provoke. If we read a novel, 
we also look at an object, the book in our hands; here, however, the ‘as-if’ of our 
aesthetic experience does not qualify our perception of the book, but our 
imagination of the action narrated. In both cases, our attention is suffused with a 
residual awareness of the ontological status of its object, but the vicarious 
character of the experience is different. While narratives let us experience an 
action when it is not taking place, pictures let us see something where it is not. 
The reception of pictures and narrative is both synchronic and diachronic, and yet 
both forms of presentation provoke a distinct form of ‘as-if’.  
The Laocoon also encapsulates the qualification that we now have to make: our 
response to pictures can imply a temporal ‘as-if’ just as narratives can trigger a 
spatial ‘as-if’. Lessing emphasizes the significance of the moment chosen to be 
depicted in painting: ‘But only that which gives free rein to the imagination is 
                                                 
51
 Wollheim 1987: 73; cf. 2001: 20. 
52
 Wollheim 1987: 46. 
53
 Note that I only accept Wollheim’s analysis of the reception of pictures. Wollheim’s 
intentionalist frame – he defines the object of ‘seeing-in’ by the intention of the artist – is as 
problematic as unnecessary: we can also ‘see in’ objects that are not shaped by human hands: we 
sometimes see animals and other beings in clouds and on rocks. Cf. Grethlein forthcoming ch. 5. 
54
 See Neer 2010: 104–41 (quotation from p.5). 
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effective. The more we see, the more we must be able to imagine.’55 It seems to 
be the before and after in particular of which Lessing is thinking here:  
However, bodies do not exist in space only, but also in time. They persist 
in time, and in each moment of their duration they may assume a different 
appearance or stand in a different combination. Each of these momentary 
appearances and combinations is the result of a preceding one and can be 
the cause of a subsequent one, which means that it can be, as it were, the 
center of an action. Consequently, painting too can imitate actions, but 
only by suggestion through bodies.
56
 
A ‘pregnant’ moment, in particular, will incite the viewer to conjecture about 
what has happened before and what is to follow. She will thus in her 
consciousness form pro- and retentions that refer to the represented scene. Note, 
however, that this temporal ‘as-if’ is derivative.57 It depends on the spatial ‘as-if’. 
Only after seeing a scene on the canvas can the onlooker speculate about the 
temporal sequence in which it is embedded. This holds true even for pictures the 
very point of which seems to be narrative, for example the works by Hogarth 
frequently invoked for the purposes of an intermedial narratology.
58
 The title, 
well-known motives and indexical representation all prompt the onlooker to think 
about the larger action of which the depicted scene forms part. Before 
conjecturing about the full action, however, the spectator needs to ‘see in’ the 
canvas the represented scene. The secondary status of the temporal ‘as-if’ in the 
response to pictures is highlighted by the fact that not all pictures trigger pro- and 
retentions referring to the represented scene. Many still lifes, for instance, lack a 
‘narrative sting’ and present only a setting. 
Visual studies have drawn our attention to the great variety of modes of viewing. 
Vision is defined ‘in terms of class, gender, sexual and racialized identities’.59 
While not preceding the culturally specific mode of viewing, ‘seeing-in’, it seems, 
                                                 
55
 Lessing 2012 (1766): 26 (English tr. 1984: 19): ‘Dasjenige aber nur allein ist fruchtbar, was der 
Einbildungskraft freyes Spiel läßt. Je mehr wir sehen, desto mehr müssen wir hinzu denken 
können.’  
56
 Lessing 2012 (1766): 115 (English tr. 1984: 78): ‘Doch alle Körper existiren nicht allein in dem 
Raume, sondern auch in der Zeit. Sie dauern fort, und können in jedem Augenblicke ihrer Dauer 
anders erscheinen, und in anderer Verbindung stehen. Jede dieser augenblicklichen Erscheinungen 
und Verbindungen ist die Wirkung einer vorhergehenden, und kann die Ursache einer folgenden, 
und sonach gleichsam das Centrum einer Handlung seyn. Folglich kann die Mahlerey auch 
Handlungen nachahmen, aber nur andeutungsweise durch Körper.’ 
57
 Mitchell’s argument against a difference of kind between time and space in picture and word is 
in many regards different from my argument (1986: 95–115). He concentrates on reception, 
medium, and content in general. Moreover, my focus on narrative is different from his focus on 
word. That being said, Mitchell’s relies on a sleight of hand when he bases his argument on the 
rejection of the dichotomy of ‘indirect’ vs. ‘direct’ (101–02). It is indeed unfortunate to use this 
dichotomy when speaking of representation, but this does not detract from the value of the 
observation that space and time play different roles in pictures and texts. 
58
 Cf. Grethlein forthcoming ch. 5; Wolf 2002.  
59
 Mirzoeff 1999: 4. 
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forms part of all different modes of viewing pictures. The Hindu receiving 
‘darshan’ from the exchange of gazes with a representation of Shiva engages in a 
different activity from the European who looks at the same picture in an art 
exhibition. But while interacting with the deity in the picture, the beholder ‘sees’ 
the divinity ‘in’ the picture. She has to recognize the represented in the 
representation. The pigments on wood, including two symmetrical dark circles 
with white circles around them, are not seen as such; rather they represent the 
eyes of a divinity from which the blessing emanates. The reverential gaze 
involves the same process of ‘seeing-in’ as that of a European art connoisseur 
comparing the eyes of Shiva with the calculating eyes of a merchant portrayed by 
Jan van Eyck. As Davis points out: ‘Some things are cultural about vision. But not 
everything.’60 
When we turn to narrative, Lessing, his emphasis on the sequential character of 
narrative notwithstanding, allows for the representation of bodies:  
On the other hand, actions cannot exist independently, but must be joined 
to certain beings or things. Insofar as these beings or things are bodies, or 
are treated as such, poetry also depicts bodies, but only by suggestion 
through actions.
61
  
Involving bodies, the narration of action brings the recipient not only to attend to 
its sequence, but also to imagine spatial settings. And yet, the spatial ‘as-if’ is 
only grafted on the temporal ‘as-if’. 
This may sound surprising, for there are texts that only describe and therefore 
primarily or exclusively induce a spatial ‘as-if’. Here, however, it is important to 
distinguish the medium of language from narrative as a mode of representation. 
Language can be used for description as well as narrative, but whereas 
description, in the canonical definition, is static,
62
 narrative represents an action in 
a sequential medium. Since stories seem to require agents, it is hard to imagine 
narratives without spatial ‘as-if’. And yet, due to the form of narrative, the 
temporal ‘as-if’ is primary. The recipient retains the fading signs and anticipates 
the coming ones, thereby attending to the action which involves a spatial setting.  
While in need of qualification, the emphasis on time in the Laocoon can serve as a 
helpful corrective to a trend in current literary studies.
63
 Cognitive scholars in 
                                                 
60
 Davis 2011: 8. 
61
 Lessing 2012 (1766): 115 (English tr. 1984: 78): ‘Auf der andern Seite können Handlungen 
nicht für sich selbst bestehen, sondern müssen gewissen Wesen anhängen. In so fern nun diese 
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 Genette 1969: 56–61. For a more recent intermedial take on description, see Wolf and Bernhart 
2007. 
63
 Cf. Grethlein 2015b with the responses by Palmer, Fludernik and Ryan in the same volume; 
2015c. 
14 
 
particular have taken a strong interest in the means by which narrative establishes 
presence and entices readers. Most of them emphasize mind-reading as essential 
to the reader’s engagement with narrative, some even contrast presence with 
plot.
64
 However, as the Husserlian approach sketched above illustrates, time is 
crucial to how readers respond to narrative. Besides the portrayal of characters, 
action has the capacity to adsorb readers. Both are in fact tightly interwoven with 
each other, as the plot features protagonists whose characters are revealed in the 
course of the action. 
Lessing’s idea of action in the Laocoon, however, is disturbingly weak.65  He 
defines the action to be represented in poetry merely as a sequence,
66
 but a 
comment in the Paralipomena indicates an awareness that more than pure 
sequence is at stake: ‘A series of movements which aim at a final telos is called an 
action.’67 Surely one can recount simple sequences, but the immersive narratives 
of which Lessing thinks have plots. In Vom Wesen der Fabel, published in 1759, 
Lessing himself had harked back to Aristotle, arguing that an action is ‘a sequence 
of changes which together form a whole’.68 Furthermore, narrative time not only 
mimics narrated time, it may also reconfigure it in order to establish what 
Sternberg calls the three master tropes of narrative: suspense, curiosity and 
surprise.
69
 Defining action as sequence is insufficient, for most narrative, and 
especially the kind of narrative Lessing envisages, features a plot. Nonetheless, 
despite this qualification, the Laocoon’s focus on time as defining feature of 
poetry highlights an aspect of narrative that the current infatuation with fictional 
minds is in danger of sidelining. 
Seen from a different perspective, Lessing’s approach ties in nicely with so-called 
second generation cognitive studies in narrative. Drawing on research into the 
embodied nature of perception, scholars such as Troscianko argue that the 
reader’s imagination is triggered more strongly by enactive narratives than 
detailed descriptions.
70
 An account of the movements of the protagonists is more 
effective in ‘transporting’ the reader to scene of the action than a minute vignette. 
The representation of action, it seems, is crucial to the imagination of space. This 
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 Palmer 2004; 2010 and Zunshine 2006 are prominent advocates of ‘fictional minds’. Presence is 
contrasted with plot for example in Kuzmičová 2012: 33. 
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 Cf. Giuliani 1996: 21-3. 
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69
 Sternberg 1992; Grethlein forthcoming ch. 2. 
70
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second-generation cognitive studies in narrative, see the special issue of Style 48, 2014. For an 
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insight is implied and given a normative twist in Lessing’s idea that narrative 
should focus on action in order to fire the imagination of the recipient. 
By no means are narrative and picture necessarily separate from each other. There 
are representational arts that combine narrative with picture, film being the 
obvious case. If a sequence of pictures is used to represent a sequential action, 
then spatial and temporal forms of ‘as-if’ are interwoven. The spectator follows an 
action where it is not taking place. On the one hand, the pictures on the screen are 
premised on a spatial ‘as-if’, on the other, their sequence triggers a temporal ‘as-
if’. While pictures can graft a temporal ‘as-if’ on their primary spatial ‘as-if’ and 
the temporal ‘as-if’ of narrative encapsulates a spatial ‘as-if’, film combines both 
forms of ‘as-if’ in a way that makes it hard to give priority to either. 
Lessing, it seems, envisaged dramatic performance as a medium capable of 
establishing a particularly strong effect on the audience. Not only do words 
represent words on stage and thereby become natural signs, but movements and 
gestures are also represented by movements and gestures themselves. Beside the 
temporal ‘as-if’ of the action, there is also the ‘as-if’ of actors who are not 
identical with their roles. In both cases, arbitrary signs have become natural signs. 
It is therefore not surprising that Lessing intended to tackle drama as the ‘highest 
genre of poetry’ in a third part of the Laocoon.71  
To be clear, the reflection on the different forms of ‘as-if’ just sketched cannot be 
found in the Laocoon. Lessing does comment on the effect of art on its audience, 
but he does not note any differences between the ‘illusions’ created by poets and 
painters.
72
 What is more, contrary to the concept of ‘as-if’ used here, Lessing 
seems to believe that poetry is able to generate a complete immersion that, at least 
for a moment, is not balanced anymore by distance. Elaborating on what 
distinguishes the poet from other authors, he asserts that the poet:  
wants rather to make the ideas he awakens in us so vivid that at that 
moment we believe that we feel the real impressions which the objects of 
these ideas would produce on us. In this moment of illusion we should 
cease to be conscious of the means which the poet uses for this purpose, 
that is, his words.
73
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 Quotation from a letter to Nicolai dating to May 26, 1769 (2012: 271). On drama and the 
planned third part of the Laocoon, see Vollhardt 2012: 445-6. For the conceptual problems to 
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In the Laocoon, the dichotomy of space and time is applied to signs and objects. 
In order to enter a ‘bequemes Verhältnis’ with the representing signs, the object of 
narrative should be action, a temporal sequence, and the object of pictures should 
be bodies, i.e. figures in space. I have thus transferred the time-space dichotomy 
from the represented objects and the representing signs to the response of the 
recipient. This modification notwithstanding, it is Lessing’s intuition that has 
helped us clarify an important point about aesthetic experience. Both pictures and 
narrative elicit from us responses that are predicated on an ‘as-if’. However, the 
pictorial ‘as-if’ is primarily spatial, while the narrative ‘as-if’ is primarily 
temporal. The dialogue staged here between Lessing and Walton illustrates the 
undiminished value of the Laocoon. Lessing’s argument surely needs to be 
historically contextualized, its essentialism obviously invites deconstructivist 
readings; at the same time, if we approach it with the kind of flexibility that its 
Protean form invites, the Laocoon is a fountain of aesthetic reflection that has yet 
to dry up. 
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